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BOOK REVIEWS
IS A FOUNTAIN: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER.
By Conrad J. Lynn. Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Co., 1979.
$12.00.
Reviewed by Leonard B. Boudin*
I have commented elsewhere on the art of judicial biography.'
The autobiographies of judges and lawyers, however, are much more
complex. Conrad Lynn, explaining that "[t]he autobiographical
exercise is a typical expression of the ego," ' 2 approaches his own life
by asking "how does the experience of the individual justify
publication? ' 3 His response-that "[t]he disappointments of early
life, if convincingly recounted, may aid a new generation in avoiding
the pitfalls which bedeviled their elders and diverted them from
their goals"'-is not quite appropriate, because life for Conrad Lynn
has been a series of accomplishments. His contribution to the law,
as he sees it, lies in providing the best and most competent representation possible for the "inarticulate peoples" with whom he has
5
identified himself since his career began in the early 1930s. By
"inarticulate peoples," the author means the Black people of the
United States.
This book is unlike other good legal autobiographies, such as
those of D.N. Pritt,' Clarence Darrow,7 and more recently Charles
Morgan," for Lynn throughout his life was very poor, a radical and,
most importantly, Black. Those portions of his autobiography that
recount his political life in college and in later years make exciting
and important reading. Lynn was the only member of the Young
Communist League at Syracuse University in the early 1930s, and
was a member of the American Communist Party in his early career
until he objected to the party's Black nationalist line.' As a young
THERE

* Member of the New York Bar. General Counsel, National Emergency Civil Liberties
Committee. B.S.S., College of the City of New York, 1933; LL.B., St. John's University, 1935.
1. Boudin, Book Review, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1977) (reviewing G. DUNNE, HUGO
BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977)).

2.

C. LYNN, THERE IS A FOUNTAIN: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER Xi

(1979).
3.

Id.

4. Id.
5. Id. at xiv.
6. D. PRITT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF D.N. PRIIrr (1966).
C. DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE (1932).
8. C. MORGAN, ONE MAN, ONE VOICE (1979); C. MORGAN, A TIME To SPEAK (1964).

7.

9. The party in the late 1930's had supported Josef Stalin, who had assisted in the
Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the French invasion of Algeria. "My loyalty to the colored
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lawyer, he joined National Lawyers Guild, which he correctly
praises for its unique role in providing legal services for politically
unpopular causes.' 0 He has been involved in most of the major political movements of our day, including the Popular Front movement,
the Spanish Civil War, and the movement for Puerto Rican independence. Most significantly, however, Lynn for many years was the
only Black lawyer handling political cases for Black people in the
United States. It is painful even for one familiar with those cases
to hear them retold en bloc, recognizing the handicaps under which
Lynn and his clients worked and the indifference (often corruption)
with which Lynn's efforts were greeted by courts and prosecutors.
There Is a Fountain" begins with a lengthy account of the
"Harlem Six" case, 12 which was also the subject of Truman Nelson's
The Torture of Mothers.'3 Lynn then discusses other causes in which
he was intimately involved as an advocate, such as U.S. Army desegregation during World War-II, the Freedom Riders, Pedro Albizu
Campos and the Puerto Rican nationalist movement, the Robert
Williams cases, 4 selective service, and the Black Panthers. Dispersed among his recollections of these cases are fragments of history, including the federal government's discrimination against
Blacks during World War II, the emergence of Black leaders such
as Malcolm X, the French air raids in Algeria during the 1950's, and
Lynn's often bitter disputes with left wing colleagues.
In the 1964 "Harlem Six" case, Lynn represented young Black
men who were charged with murder during a street disturbance in
New York City and convicted upon the testimony of an ex-convict.
As one reads Lynn's presentation together with the appellate briefs
people of the world," Lynn explains, "was far greater than my loyalty to a political party. I
had used the Communist party as an instrument; the goal was the liberation of the nonwhite
peoples of the earth." C. LYNN, supra note 2, at 67.
10. Id. at 208.
11. The title is taken from the lyrics of an old Protestant hymn:
There is a fountain filled with blood
Drawn from Immanuel's veins
And sinners plunged beneath that flood
Lose all their guilty stains.
The dying thief rejoiced to see
That fountain in his day
And there may I, though vile as he
Wash all my sins away.
C. LYNN, supra note 2, at frontispiece.
12. People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 307, 244 N.E.2d 232, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1968).
13. T. NELSON, THE TORTURE OF MOTHERS (1965).
14. E.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 378 U.S. 548 (1964) (per curiam), vacating and
remanding State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 804, 117 S.E. 2d 824 (1961) (Lynn and this reviewer
were co-counsel for the petitioner Williams); see notes 43-48 infra and accompanying text.
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in that case, it is obvious that these young men were prosecuted
solely because they sought to protect Harlem children from police
violence. The details of this case, which will concern every person
devoted to civil rights and liberties, include police raids on the
defendants' homes, the appointment by the court of inadequate
lawyers instead of the private counsel retained by the defendants'
mothers in order that "the defendants. . . be protected from themselves,"' 5 racially contemptuous judicial behavior toward the defendants,'" exorbitant bail, perjured testimony, and egregious prosecutorial misconduct. 7 Is there anything in similar Southern cases,
such as those of the "Scottsboro Boys," 1 Angelo Herndon,19 and Leo
Frank,2" that is worse? What was heartening in the "Harlem Six"
case was Lynn's constancy and the entry of other New York lawyers,
most notably William Kunstler, Gene Ann Condon, and my old
associates Samuel Neuberger and Mary M. Kaufman.
After discussing the "Harlem Six," Lynn turns to his unsuccessful attempt to protect his brother Winfred from discriminatory
conscription practices in World War II. Here one is appalled by the
indifference of a federal judge to fundamental constitutional issues;
Lynn concludes "it is surprising that moral cowardice is no more
prevalent than it is."2 The Second Circuit held in that case that
both federal statute and custom justified segregation in the United
States armed forces, and that the fourteenth amendment to the
federal Constitution "did not clearly show the intent of Congress to
change this practice. 2' 2 Lynn considers this case conclusive proof of
the essentially racist nature of American society.2 3 Nevertheless,
much good work was done by the Lynn Committee Against Segrega15. C. LYNN, supra note 2, at 10.
16. At one point during trial, the judge remarked that "[t]hese boys wouldn't know a
good lawyer from a good watermelon." Id. at 14.
17. Four of the defendants agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge of manslaughter,
for which they would be sentenced to the time they had already served, but only if the other
two defendants were "part of any deal that was made." The district attorney's office agreed
to the arrangement, honored it as to the four plea bargaining defendants, and told Lynn and
his co-counsel there "would be no objections" to releasing the other two. The other two,
however, were not released. One was released in 1973, and the other is currently awaiting a
new trial. Id. at 32-33.
18. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). For a detailed discussion of that case by
one of the defendants, see N. WASHINGTON, THE LAST OF THE SCOTTSBORO Boys (1979).
19. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
20. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
21. C. LYNN, supra note 2, at 95. The author adds that "[i]t is considered a mark of
ability for judges in this country to evade basic matters of principle when deciding cases:
don't be controversial and don't rock the boat. This is particularly true in wartime." Id.
22. Id. at 100-01.

23. Id. at 101.
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tion in the Armed Forces, which was concerned primarily with mistreatment of the neuropsychiatric casualties of the war. 4
At this point in his career, however, Lynn tells us he seriously
contemplated giving up the law because it "seemed too tricky and
devious" for him,25 and because of the extreme dearth of Black
lawyers in New York City. 2 Lynn continued in practice, however,

for reasons that were highly personal:
I began to realize that the great attraction the law had for me was the
mental strain it exacted. Also, I was slightly arrogant, and nothing was more
sobering than to run into a superior mind that made me acknowledge I was
not omniscient. Since humility was not one of my inherited characteristics,
bruising conflict in the office and courtroom enabled me to be a tolerable
companion in social life.Y

He soon became one of the early Freedom Riders who traveled to
the South for the purpose of testing the legality of accommodating
passengers by race in interstate travel, although the Supreme Court
had already ruled in the Morgan case2 8 that such segregation was
unconstitutional. One of the organizers of Lynn's trip was James
Peck, who is presently suing the Federal Bureau of Investigation not
only for failing to protect him from mob action during that trip but
also for employing an informant who was part of the conspiracy to
beat up the travelers. 9
Lynn discusses "The Fight Against McCarthyism" very briefly,
narrating the extraordinary case of Carl and Anne Braden, who were
charged with sedition in Kentucky because of the sale of their home
to a Black couple."0 I was also involved in the early stages of that
case, which was supported by the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. Lynn joined the Committee "[b]ecause so many people
[who were accused of being Communists or fellow travelers] were
being hounded out of government jobs, teacher positions, and even
private assignments."'" The aftermath of that case was a subpoena
to Carl Braden issued by the House Committee on Unamerican
Activities, which he resisted on first amendment grounds that were
ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court. 2
24. Id. at 105.
25.
26.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 108. For example, Lynn tells us that in the 1950's there were more than one

million Blacks living in New York City, but that some 85% of their legal work was being done
by white law firms. Id.
27. Id. at 107.
28. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
29. Peck v. Kelly, Civ. No. 76-983 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 2, 1976).
30. C. LYNN, supra note 2, at 118; see Braden v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1956).
31. C. LYNN, supra note 2, at 117.
32. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
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Lynn's discussion of his Communist past and revolutionary
commitment is quite open, and he criticizes those fellow radicals of
his early years who later tried to present themselves as "twentiethcentury Americans" who "never contemplated overthrowing the
existing capitalist structure. '33 This is a rather harsh criticism, however, of people who usually sought by their silence to protect others,
not themselves. Although Lynn admits he was self-employed during
the McCarthy era and therefore was "not as vulnerable as someone
who was at the mercy of an employer," he nevertheless refuses to
forgive those who "sold out" when "my license to practice law was
constantly endangered, and it was not uncommon for a disgruntled
client to complain about my political views to the bar association
'3
in an effort to have me disbarred.
Lynn's devotion to Pedro Albizu Campos and the Puerto Rican
Independence Movement is a major theme of his autobiography.
During his debating days at Syracuse Universiiy, he tells us, he had
espoused the cause of the Nicaraguan revolutionary Sandino (whose
name was properly invoked by the recently successful Sandinist
movement that overthrew the dictatorship of Gen. Antonio Somosa), and had criticized the United States' dealings with "the
neocolonies of Cuba and Haiti" which, he argues, "foreshadowed
the program for Puerto Rico." 35 Lynn describes Campos as a World
War I volunteer who had been consigned to work with a black labor
regiment in Panama, where he had been subjected to racism by
United States forces stationed there." Although Campos graduated
from Harvard and became a lawyer whose advice was eagerly sought
by American corporations, he later joined and led the Nationalist
Party in Puerto Rico. Lynn tells us of Campos' conviction in 1936
of "conspiracy to overthrow the United States government in Puerto
Rico," 3 7 of his subsequent prosecution in 1950 for advocating the
overthrow of the United States government,38 and of his release in
November 1953 and reimprisonment in 1954 after four Puerto Riqan
Nationalists had fired guns from the gallery of the House of Representatives and wounded five Congressmen. 9
Lynn tells the extraordinary story of his efforts to free Campos
based upon the unconstitutionality of the pardon document," which
33.

C. LYNN, supra note 2, at 117.

34. Id.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

123.
123-24.
125.
128.
134-35.
135-40.
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had provided for reimprisonment if he attempted or conspired
against the public security by "intending to subvert by violence or
terror the constitutionally established order."'"
I attended a meeting in the 1950's at which Robert Williams, a
young Black activist, disturbed a liberal middle class audience by
asserting the right of Blacks to use violence to protect themselves.
One has only to read Lynn's account of Monroe, North Carolina
during that period to understand Williams. As president of the
Union County NAACP, he first posed the issue of the right of Black
children to use the county's white swimming pool after two Black
children were drowned'while swimming in a creek.42 Then came the
"Kissing Case" in which two Black children, ages seven and nine,
were sentenced to twelve and fourteen years' imprisonment respectively for allegedly kissing (or apparently being kissed) by some
white children while playing house in a culvert. Williams asked
Lynn to enter the cae because of Lynn's willingness to handle unpopular and dangerous cases.43 This was more than the state or national NAACP was willing to do. Lynn's story of his appearance
before the Juvenile Court judge must be read to be believed, as
illustrated by the following colloquy:
Lynn: Judge, assuming that Sissy Marcus did kiss Hanover Thompson, and
it was only on the cheek as I understand, why did you sentence Fuzzy
Simpson?
Judge: Sah! Don't you realize what that nigger boy witnessed? Don't you
know what was planted in his mind? It'll take at least fourteen years to rehabilitate him."

Lynn then describes the publicity campaign that he instituted, and
the subsequent issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus because
Williams had pointed out that "Southern judges who were about to
retire often wanted to do something to salve their consciences after
spending a lifetime dispensing unequal justice."4 5 Lynn lost the case
but the children were released and their criminal records destroyed
after an extraordinary chain of telephone calls from Lynn to Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt, from Mrs. Roosevelt to President Eisenhower,
and from Eisenhower to North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges.
"It may not have been legal," Lynn triumphantly concludes, "but
it was effective."" Lynn then tells of Williams' press statement
41. Id. at 135.
42. Id. at 142.
43. Lynn tells us that "[m]y office has been called 'the house of last resort."' Id. at
143.
44. Id. at 145.
45. Id. at 150.
46. Id. at 156.
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advocating Black violence in response to Southern injustice. 7 Williams was suspended from the NAACP, was clubbed and convicted
of trespass and disorderly conduct for attempting to desegregate a
drugstore,"8 and was charged with kidnapping by people whose lives
he had actually saved.
The fiery lawyer who describes these events is not a prototype
of the American civil liberties lawyer. The average lawyer in that
class came out of an Ivy League law school and was an editor of his
law review. Many worked for a New Deal federal agency, usually the
National Labor Relations Board. Whether liberal or radical in their
political orientation, some joined the Communist Party, but all
joined the National Lawyers Guild. Many of these young people
became lawyers for the new progressive American labor movement,
fought in World War II, or were members either of the Office of
Special Services (OSS) or the Board of Economic Warfare, both
predecessors of the Central Intelligence Agency. They wrote, interpreted, and enforced much of our liberal legislation. They were an
extraordinary group of young men who were devoted to the country's
welfare.
A second wave of liberal lawyers came with the civil rights
movement of the 1960's and the Vietnam War. They were larger in
number, a greater proportion came from the South, and there were
a few Black lawyers like Howard Moore of Atlanta. Very few entered
government service. Their sympathies embraced a somewhat different caseload; many had criminal law experience at an early age.
Many of these young advocates joined legal aid societies, public
defender groups, and the legal services corporation. Their work with
the poor is today far more important than the more spectacular
political litigation in which so many of us were heavily involved.
The National Lawyers Guild, of which many of the second wave
liberal lawyers are members, still remains the most significant bar
association of the country devoted to the interests of the politically
disinherited. It has remained alive despite the extraordinary efforts
of the American Bar Association during the 1950's, and the more
recent efforts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (through the
COINTEL program) to discredit it. It has published very important
manuals on the military draft, wiretapping, and grand juries, and
47.

Id. at 159. The press statement read in part: "[Tihe Negro in the South cannot

expect justice in the courts. He must convict his attackers on the spot. He must meet violence
with violence and lynching with lynching." Id.
48. See Williams v. North Carolina, 378 U.S. 548 (1964)(per curiam), vacating and
remanding State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 804, 117 S.E.2d 824 (1961), in which Lynn and this

reviewer were co-counsel for the petitioner Williams.
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can look forward to a much greater future if it keeps internecine
warfare to a minimum. The problems of American law and society
are so difficult that the efforts of that great organization ought to
be concentrated on those problems.
Conrad Lynn, as I have suggested in this review, is sui generis.
He appears to have oriented his entire life and work around two
basic principles. First, he is an ardent Marxist who believes that
"the basic ideas of Karl Marx have afforded a key to understanding
the fundamental factors about which the World has been in conflict
for the last 150 years." 9 Second, Lynn is both motivated and
thrilled by the recent advent of Black pride in the inner cities and
in "the prisons, where so many of our children are receiving their
basic political education. '5° This "new wave" of cultural and political awareness, Lynn argues, has given rise to the realization that
"black victims of the system" still need militant lawyers of Lynn's
ilk." He is by no means a has-been.
I recognize the extraordinary honesty, and indeed arrogance, in
Lynn's evaluation of society, his colleagues, and himself. Emphasizing his individuality, he claims that while the opportunity to join
the Establishment was often snatched away from him, the
"[rjivalries and jealousies of my left associates" often prevented
him from becoming a member of their Establishment as well.2
Some have argued that Lynn's friendships were neither deep nor
long lasting, but this is really not true. As Lynn states in the introduction to his autobiography, "[i]t would be more nearly accurate
to say that the fidelity of many of my companions to our common
goal was fleeting, and we parted when they listened to another
siren. . . .The aim is not to villify or muckrake but to show how
difficult it is to pursue the North Star."53
49. C. LYNN, supra note 2, at xii.
50. Id. at xiv.
51. Id. at xiv-xv.
52. Id. at xiv.
53. Id.
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LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS.

Second edition. By

Edmund W. Kitch and Harvey S. Perlman. Mineola, N.Y.: The
Foundation Press, Inc., 1979. Pp. xliv, 1098. $24.50 cloth. Statutory
supplement. $5.75 paper.
Reviewed by Kenneth B. Germain*
Although considerably overdue in light of major developments
in the mid-1970s,l the new edition of this casebook is well worth
waiting for. Indeed, its authors have successfully built upon the
solid' foundation they laid in the first edition by some helpful reorganization, some sensible condensation, and some crucial expansion
into new areas, in addition to the necessary updating. Consequently, this book represents the finest published casebook available for a broad-based course in Unfair Trade Practices, with the
caveat that if a substantial segment of the course is devoted to
"consumerism," another book may be preferable.'
The opening chapter, entitled "The Problem of Entry," has
been expanded substantially since the first edition. A few new cases
have been added, notably George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock
Pool Builders, Inc.,' which presents some provocative aspects of
the interplay between federal and state law in an antitrust context. Significantly, this case, along with the earlier materials in
the chapter, tends to indicate the precarious balance between
"unfair" and "competition." This case is followed by the classic
INS case " which, in turn, is followed by the landmark Sears, and
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B., Rutgers
University, 1966; J.D. New York University, 1969.
1. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret
law not preempted by federal patent law); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)(state
"tape piracy" statutes not preempted by United States Constitution or federal Copyright
Act); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976); Copyright Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-809 (1976).
2. See Germain, Book Review, 5 RuTr.-CAm. L.J. 185 (1973); Maggs, Book Review, 52
NEB. L. REV. 308 (1973).
3. Because this reviewer currently structures his Unfair Trade Practices course in this
fashion, he prefers S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION (3d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1977), reviewed in Germain, Book Review, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1256 (1974).
4. 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); see E. KITCH & H.
PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 10-16 (2d ed. 1979).
5. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (announced the
arrival of the elusive "misappropriation" concept to protect plaintiff news gathering agency
from having its news "pirated" by a competitor); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4,
at 18-33.
6. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (federal preemption of state
unfair competition laws that prohibited "product simulation"); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN,
supra note 4, at 39-43.
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Compco7 opinions. This new organization permits the overriding
"preemption" issue to be introduced early enough in the course so
that its parameters can be pursued more thoroughly in later
materials.
Also noteworthy in the first chapter is the brief new section on
"The Regulation of Public Goods,"' which serves both to introduce
the curious concept of "public goods"' and to raise a number of
crucial questions concerning the interface of law and economics.
Such an orientation, of course, has become associated with the University of Chicago School of Law, where Professor Kitch teaches.
The first chapter concludes with a new section on "The Regulation
of Advertising," which features the important Virginia State
Board'0 "commercial speech" case, 1' and an interesting note probing
the economic and social justification of advertising and trademark
protection."2 Thus, the first chapter of the new edition, which is
broader, longer, and more stimulating than its predecessor, repre13
sents a noteworthy improvement.
The second chapter, entitled "Misleading Practices," follows
the organizational trail blazed in the first edition except that it
dubiously separates the opening common-law false advertising materials from the later discussion of sections 43(a) and 44 of the Lanham Act, 4 placing these closely related topics on either side of a
somewhat incongruous discussion of disparagement. 5 This reviewer
7. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); see E. KrrCH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 43-47.
8. E. KrrCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 48-54.
9. The authors define the term "public goods" as follows:
There is a class of goods known as "public goods," wherein the amount of use of the good
or service by one person does not reduce the amount available to others if the good has
been produced. Classic examples are melodies, poems, ideas, and theories. Anyone can
use them without in any way reducing someone else's supply.
E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 48 (quoting A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND
PRODUCTION, THEORY IN USE 251 (1969)).
10. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976) (invalidating on first amendment grounds a state statute prohibiting advertising of prescription drug prices); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 54-65.
11. This might be a good place for the authors to discuss the very recent and controversial case of Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), in which the Supreme Court upheld a state
law prohibiting the use of trade names for optometrical enterprises.
12. E. KITcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 67-74.
13. On the negative side, this reviewer believes that the "Hit Parade" case, Advance
Music Corp. v. American Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946) (music publishing
company's claim that creators of a radio program supposedly featuring the most currently
popular songs "wantonly" omitted its songs from the program with the intent to injure
plaintiff recognized as stating a cause of action), which probes the "prima facie tort" concept,
should appear somewhere in the first chapter.
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a), 1126 (1976).
15. 'Disparagement, which is also known as "trade libel" or "injurious falsehood," has
been defined as follows:
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would adjust the order of presentation so as to allow a smoother flow
from the common law of false advertising to the statutory treatment
of that topic, which could then be followed by the different concept
of disparagement. As an alternative, disparagement could be dis-

cussed first, followed by common law and then statutory false advertising materials. The latter approach would be advantageous in

that the student would learn about the common-law tort of dispar-

agement before seeing in the Skit case"5 that section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act does have a role to play in cases involving inaccurate
product comparisons in advertisements.
Aside from the above organizational defects, the second chapter
is well done. The Benzo Gas case 7 that was featured in the first
edition has been retired in favor of a recent case' 8 that provides a
pleasant update on common-law disparagement. Unfortunately,
however, this case contains some rather unorthodox rulings on special damages and burden of proof that may mislead students unless
carefully countered by proper statements of the current state of the
law." While the Kemart case 21 on privileges has sensibly been reOne who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject to
liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other
having a pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do
so, and
(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or
falsity.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977).
16. Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (interpreting
Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912
(1970), which held that section 43(a) does not encompass false representations about a
competitor's product); see E. KrrCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 123-25.
17. National Refining Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel Co., 20 F.2d 763 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 570 (1927) (containing a classic explication of the basic principles of
"disparagement," as applied to a defendant's assertion that plaintiffs gasoline and benzol
fuel was injurious to engines).
18. Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Development Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750
(D.N.J. 1976) (the security of plaintiff's instant lottery tickets was challenged without explanation by defendant, an overzealous competitor); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4,
at 86-96.
19. The reported case holds that in disparagement cases the burden of proving the truth
of the statement lies with the defendant as in defamation cases; not, as is generally held, that
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show its falsity. The case also holds that no "special
damages" are required in disparagement suits, in direct opposition to well-recognized principles. Significantly, the casebook authors half-heartedly sought to correct these misimpressions of current law by stating, in one paragraph of a note following this eleven-page case,
that the Third Circuit reversed the district court on both grounds. See E. KiTcH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 97 (citing Systems Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Development Corp., 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977)).
20. Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Research Lab., Inc., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 893 (1959) (allowing, under the "rival claimant's privilege," one competitor
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tained, the Smith-Victor case,2 ' which effectively summarized the
material in chapter two of the first edition, has been deleted. One
beneficial byproduct of the deletion, however, is that this case might
now be used as a class problem or an examination question.
Coverage of the ever-growing "statutory civil wrong of false
representation"22 encompassed by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act

23

is considerably and capably expanded in the second edition. On the
negative side, however, the authors chose not to segregate section
44 of the Act from section 43(a), thereby potentially creating the
misapprehension that those two sections are related to each other.
Furthermore, the coverage allotted to section 44-almost seven
a dead letter on the
pages-seems excessive, considering that it 2is
4
domestic front except in the Ninth Circuit.
In the second edition's subchapter on purchaser's remedies, a
section addresses statutory remedies available to consumers, as
opposed to competitors. This is a timely topic. It includes the now
well-established Colligan case 25 disavowing a consumer right of action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, and the new
Kipperman case, 2 which, in covering private actions that are judito honestly, but falsely, advise members of the relevant trade that plaintiff's process infringed
its patented process); see E. KrrCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 106-09.
21. Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965)
(multicount complaint alleged disparagement and false advertising violative of common law,
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a state criminal antifraud statute, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act).
22. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954). Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act is a federal statute that creates an action for false advertising and
other unfair competitive practices where the common law did not provide any effective relief.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976); see Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act: You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 49 IND. L.J.
84 (1973); Lunsford, Protection From False and Misleading Advertising, 35 FED. B.J. 87
(1976).
24. See Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950) (holding that a cause of action
for unfair competition was stated under section 44 even though both plaintiff and defendant
were citizens of the same state and notwithstanding the existence of any other federal question). Contrast the view accepted in other federal circuits:
[S]ection 44, which together with Section 39 contains the provisions of the Lanham Act
relied on here as the basis of jurisdiction, reveals merely a design to give United States
citizens reciprocal rights against foreign nationals where foreign nationals compete unfairly with them. It does not aim to create a federal law of unfair competition available
to United States citizens one against the other nor does it grant the federal courts any
new authority to hear such controversies between citizens.
L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 652 (3d Cir. 1954).
25. Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971) (section 43(a)
does not create a cause of action in favor of mere consumers who claim that its provisions
were violated); see E. KiTCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 160-64.
26. Kipperman v. Academy Life Ins. Co., 554 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1977) (establishing a
private right of action under 39 U.S.C. § 3009 (1976), which makes the mailing of unsolicited
merchandise a per se unfair trade practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act); see E.
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 165-68.
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cially implied from federal statutes, sets the scene for an important
note on consumer actions based on the Federal Trade Commission
Act.27 The last section of the subchapter discusses consumer class
actions. Here the mammoth, confusing Eisen saga" has been relegated to a note 9 in favor of two clearer, more manageable cases
followed by improved textual notes.
The next subchapter in Chapter Two is devoted to the Federal
Trade Commission. Its page coverage has justifiably been doubled
so that it now is quite comprehensive, and its organization and
content are quite sound. For example, the subchapter starts with
good background text followed by intriguing policy pieces by Professor Richard Posner ° and FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky.3 1 The
former explains why the dissemination of misleading information is
commercially and legally dysfunctional to advertisers; the latter
argues that the market system is inadequate to protect consumer
interests. The standard "Rejuvenescence" case 3 has been retained
and fortified by reworked notes that pay special attention to the
constitutional dimensions of advertising regulation. The famous
Pfizer "Un-burn" case,3 which officially announced the arrival of
the "unfairness" doctrine has been added, although it might have
been better positioned after the "California white pine" case,34
which, like the "Rejuvenescence" case, is a "deceptiveness" case
rather than an "unfairness" case.
The FTC subchapter also contains some apt examples of trade
regulation rules 35 and a brief but helpful introduction to the
27. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 168 n.2.
28. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The eight-year history of this
case is detailed in the Supreme Court opinion. See 417 U.S. at 160-69.
29. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 175.
30.

Id., at 182-85 (excerpting R. POSNER, REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC

(1973)).

31. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 185-90 (excerpting Pitofsky, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protectionand the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661, 66371 (1977)).
32. Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (unsubstantiated advertising claims that a facial cream could rejuvenate its users' faces held a deceptive
trade practice under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, since deceptiveness is
to be judged not by a reasonable person standard, but rather by what has come to be known
as the "fool's test"); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 191-94.
33. Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972) (advertising claims violate the "unfairness" aspect
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act when, even if they might be truthful, there
is no "reasonable basis" for believing them at the time they are issued); see E. KITCH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 198-206.
34. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (it is a deceptive practice under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to sell yellow pine, an inferior type, under
the trade designation "California white pine," where white pine is a superior type); see E.
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 209-15.
35. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 233-37.
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Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act's provisions," the latter of which is

effectively designed to give the student a sense of the Act's basic
thrust.3 7 Of considerable importance is the new section on

"Remedies and Enforcement," 3 which provides3 9in-depth coverage
of the novel "corrective advertising" technique.
Chapter Three is entitled "Product and Producer Identity,"
which is the authors' name for what is more commonly known as
"trademarks and trade dress." This chapter, a good deal longer than
its forerunner, contains a very sound, comprehensive treatment of
virtually ° all of the relevant areas. Of special note are some of the
new entries: the Artie Shaw imitation recording case, 4 ' which demonstrates the difference between trademark law's bent toward protection and competition theory's preference for permissiveness, and
a needed note on domestic and international registrations under the
42
Lanham Act.

The authors handle the particulars of trademark law especially

well. Generic marks are clearly explicated, and the "Lite" case 3 is

put to good use. The tough question whether generic marks can be
redeemed by the acquisition of secondary meaning is represented by
the brief notation of a recent case that answered it in the negative.4
A nice, modern substitute for the timeworn surname cases has been
found,45 and a topic on the "subject matter" of trademarks has been
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976).
37. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 240 n.*.
3S. Id. at 244-67.
39. "Corrective advertising" is a novel remedy whereby a party who has misled someone
is required to correct the misimpressions it perpetrated, either by mandatory public statements or by a restriction that a certain portion of its future advertising contain "corrective"
36.

statements. Typically "corrective" messages must indicate tha the disseminator earlier

misled its audience and that it now seeks to set the record straight.
40.

One area that might have been included is the liability of trademark licensors for

the torts of their licensees. See Borchard & Ehrlich, FranchisorTort Liability: Minimizing
the Potential Liability of a FranchisprFor a Franchisee's Torts, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 109

(1979); Germain, Tort Liability of Trademark Licensors in an Era of "Accountability": A
Tale of Three Cases, 69 TRADEMARK REP. 128 (1979).
41. Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201, 341 N.E.2d 817,379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975)

(famous clarinetist of a bygone era was not entitled to stop modem recreations of his "sound,"
provided that no confusion of source or sponsorship could be proven); see E. KrrcH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 277-80.
42.
43.

E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 286-88.
Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Lite"

and its phonetic equivalents held generic as applied to low calorie, less filling beer); see E.
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 306-08.
44. CES Publishing Corp. v. St. Regis Publications Inc., 531 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1975) (the
trademark "Consumer Electronics Monthly," which was generic as applied to a magazine
oriented toward tradespeople in the consumer electronic field, could not be protected through
the acquisition of secondary meaning); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 310-11.
45. Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards, Inc., 569 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1978) (Walter
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added, featuring a good recent case on "functionality."" An enlarged section on adoption, affixation, and use now appears. The
treatment of the enigmatic doctrine of "incontestability,"4' 7 which
this reviewer once improperly criticized," has been updated and
clarified somewhat, and the leading "Eveready" case" has been
included, although in summarized form. The area of "noncompeting" goods5" has been improved by the. addition of the
"Wombles" 51 and "Rally" 52 cases. The former is a humorous and
effective vehicle introducing the basic problem, albeit with a rather
questionable solution, whereas the latter shows the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' liberality in recognizing market related
S. Taylor, grandson of the original Taylor of Taylor Wine fame, and himself experienced in
the wine business, allowed to use his full name long with his trademark-"Bully Hill"provided that his labels also include an express disclaimer of any connection with the predecessor company); see E. KiTcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 318-22.
46. Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977) (first user
of film "kiosks" not entitled to enjoin second user of same concept since only functional, as
opposed to source-indicating, features had been copied); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra
note 4, at 332-36. A feature of an item is "functional" if it "affects [the] purpose, action or
performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using [the item]."
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938). Only nonfunctional features may possibly serve as protectible source-indicators and then only upon establishment of a secondary meaning.
47. "Incontestability" is a concept that derives from sections 15 and 33(b) of the Lanham Act. Although it was originally touted as one of the major advances of the Act, it has
yet to be demonstrated that an "incontestable" mark is notably superior to any other mark
that has remained on the Principal Register for at least five years and is thus subject to
cancellation only on the limited grounds contained in sections 14(c) and (e).
48. In Germain, supra note 3, at 1257-58, this reviewer erroneously wrote that the first
edition of the Kitch and Perlman casebook had failed to include "references to a number of
relevant articles" on incontestability. In fact, the first edition did include such references.
49. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976) (rejecting well-established doctrine that "incontestability" under sections 15
and 33(b) of the Lanham Act only had "defensive" uses); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN', supra
note 4, at 351-52.
50. "Noncompeting" goods are products that do not satisfy needs for each other but
might be considered as so "related" to each other that confusion of source might ensue from
the application of the same or substantially similar marks. See, e.g., Yale Electric Corp. v.
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928) ("Yale" as applied to flashlights and batteries as
opposed to locks and keys).
51. Wombles Ltd. v. Wombles Skips Ltd., [1977] R.P.C. 99 (Ch. 1975) (owner of
famous English trademark "Wombles" (for mythical creatures who supposedly thrive on
cleaning up Wimbledon Common), having broadly licensed the mark for all sorts of products,
denied an interlocutory injunction against use of "Wombles" on commercial garbage collection containers on the ground that the litigants' uses of the mark were not on closely enough
related goods); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 371-73.
52. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (the mark "Rally"
for automobile cleaner-polisher held registrable under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act notwithstanding the existence of a prior use of the same mark on all-purpose detergent, where
the prior user expressly recognized the unlikelihood of marketplace confusion); see E. KrrcH
& H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 377-82.
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concepts as bearing upon the judicial resolution of trademark dis53
putes .
"Confusion of sponsorship" 54 is now handled by one of the
"patches" cases,5" and an interesting state-run lottery case.5 The
former presents a good contrast between the public interest in readily available, 16w-priced goods and the commercial interest in relative monopoly. The latter reflects the important need to accommodate trademark protection to the overriding needs of the general
public. At this point, however, the authors make an unnecessarily
abrupt transition to the "dilution" doctrine. 57 Although the primary
case" is a good one, it would be more meaningful if it followed the
smirk-inducing "bugs" case59 that was included in the first edition,
for this case served as an excellent link between the true
"noncompeting but related goods" cases and the true "dilution"
53. Cf. Beatrice Food Co. v. Fairway Foods, Inc., 429 F.2d 466 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (concurrent use proceeding under section 2(d) of the Lanham Act, holding that the Patent and
Trademark Office should give considerable credence to bona fide agreements between lawful
concurrent users when the agreements expressly recognize the various parties' exclusive
trademark rights in prescribed geographical areas).
54. "Confusion of sponsorship" occurs when, although it is unlikely that the consuming
public would be confused regarding the source of goods or services, it is likely that the public
might believe that goods or services were being endorsed or "sponsored" by a party known to
use the mark. For example, the young women's magazine Seventeen was able to establish
that its readers were likely to believe that it in some way "sponsored" youth girdles sold under
the mark "Miss Seventeen." Triangle Publications Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir.
1948).
55. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975) (National Hockey League, to which member
teams' rights had been assigned, obtained an injunction barring an unlicensed company from
making and selling cloth "patches" showing team logos); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra
note 4, at 383-88. For a discussion of the "patches" cases, see Fletcher, Still More About

Patches, 67

TRADEMARK REP.

76 (1977).

56. National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435 F. Supp. 1372 (D.Del. 1977)
(state lottery director enjoined to disclaim NFL sponsorship of state-run football lottery); E.
KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 388-93.
57. "Dilution" is a doctrine, based almost exclusively on state statutes, that is designed
to combat the weakening of otherwise strong marks by use of the same or confusingly similar
marks on totally unrelated products or services. It goes beyond "confusion of sponsorship"
and seeks to protect against "a likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark. . . notwithstanding the absence of competition between
the parties or of confusion as to source of the goods or services." Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 140, § 22
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979).
58. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369
N.E.2d 1162, 390 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1977) ("Allied Maintenance," a highly descriptive and common mark for cleaning and maintenance services, held by a narrowly divided court not
protectable via dilution theory from "Allied Mechanical Trades" as used for installation and
repair of heating and cooling systems, on the ground that the former mark was so weak as
not to be susceptible to "dilution"); see E. KTCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 396-400.
59. Chemical Corp. of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 965 (1962) ("Where there's life, there's bugs" used as an advertising slogan
for an insecticide).
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cases. Similarly disappointing is the strange underemphasis afforded the momentous "Big 0" case,60 which deserves much more
than summary treatment in a note. Indeed, this case is so allencompassing that this reviewer has sometimes thought he could
teach most or all of trademark law by using it as an example. In a
welcome organizational switch, which this reviewer earlier recommended,61 the authors have placed remedies, assignment and licensing, and contributory infringement,62 in the trademark chapter,
rather than in the separate conglomerate chapter on the enforcement of intellectual property rights which appeared at the end of
the first edition. The subject of abandonment, 3 headed by the instructive "Cook's Goldblume" case," is also a nice addition, which
helps make the new version of the trademark materials seem even
stronger than the old.
Chapter Four, entitled "Predatory Practices," combines the
two first edition chapters on predatory and pricing matters, and
condenses the latter materials considerably. The introductory notes
on various pricing practices, such as sales below cost, price discrimination, and refusals to deal are sensibly capsulized to fifteen pages.
The following materials, on interference with contractual relations,
are fortified by new notes and problems, but would benefit still
further from addition of the text of sections 766 to 774A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,65 which set forth the basic "rules"
that generally govern this complex tort.
The next topic, "Appropriation," covers the protection of ideas
by confidence, contract, or common-law copyright. The standard
60. Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo.
1976), modified, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978) (largest
American tire manufacturer held liable for trademark infringement and "disparagement" for
commencing a mammoth advertising campaign featuring the mark "Bigfoot" after discovering the plaintiff's prior use of the same mark, also on tires; plaintiff recovered compensatory
and punitive damages totaling some $4.75 million, one of the largest awards on record in a
case of this type); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 401 n.2.
61. Germain, supra note 2, at 188.
62. This would also be a good place for insertion of the trademark licensor tort liability
matter referred to in note 40 supra.
63. "Abandonment" of a mark occurs when a mark owner allows a mark to fall into
disuse with an accompanying intent to relinquish its rights in the mark. It can also be defined
to include loss of rights by genericization of the mark. The definition in section 45 of the
Lanham Act covers both meanings.
64. Sterling Brewers, Inc. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 441 F.2d 675 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (federal
registration of mark "Cook's Goldblume" not abandoned despite nonuse for period of almost
ten years when initial nonuse was due to labor dispute, during which period owner constantly
tried to arrange reopening of the brewery, and when mark demonstrated immediate consumer
recognition upon resumption of use); see E. KiTCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 423-26.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766-774A (1979).
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Bristol case 6 is sufficient to state the traditional view, but regrettably the pivotal sentence in the opinion-"plaintiff communicated
his system without marketing it"7-is again edited out. 8 What is
really needed here, however, is an instructive case69 or note on the
methods modern companies use to deal with submissions of ideas
by outsiders. 7 The basic materials on idea protection are followed
by materials dealing with the overriding preemption problem. 7' The
older cases have been neatly compacted into two pages of notes
which lead comfortably to the landmark Goldstein tape piracy case72
and the presumably preemptive section of the new federal Copyright Act, 73 embellished by some of the latter's confusing legislative

history.
Trade secrets are covered in much the same way as in the first
edition, except that one new case 74 has been added to show the
"compensatory" nature of injunctions in this area. The problem of
customer lists75 is relocated as a subpart of trade secrets. A new
66. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 30 N.E. 506 (1892) (plaintiff, who unsolicitedly divulged his business idea in a letter sent to the defendant, held
unprotected against use of that idea without consent or compensation notwithstanding the
letter's conclusion requesting confidentiality); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at
475-76.
67. Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 132 N.Y. 264, 268, 30 N.E. 506, 507
(1892).
68. This omission is "pivotal" because the quoted sentence clearly emphasizes the
essence of the law of protection of ideas-that concepts of "contract" or "confidence," both
of which rely upon predisclosure behavior control, rather than generalized concepts of
property.
69. See, e.g., Downey v. General Foods Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972) (unsolicited idea submitted by consumer did not require compensation
when "used" since it had been anticipated by company's advertising department which
maintained separate files for consumer input information).
70. For example, some companies set up separate files for ideas submitted by nonemployees. These files are carefully kept apart from information developed by their own research
and development divisions. See id.
71. "Preemption" is shorthand for "preemption of state law by conflicting federal law"
either due to the preference given to federal statutes over state law by the Supremacy Clause
("statutory preemption") or by the direct preemptive effect of the United States Constitution
("constitutional preemption").
72. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (state "tape piracy" statutes not
preempted by United States Constitution or federal Copyright Act); see E. KITCH & H.
PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 491-502.
. 73. Copyright Act of 1976, § 301, 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). The preemptive impact vel
non of § 301 is quite controversial, as the statutory language indicates a broad impact while
the legislative history is hopelessly confused. The likely judicial interpretation will be very
narrow, in this reviewer's opinion, in keeping with the thrust of such recent, related Supreme
Court decisions as Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcastingCo., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
74. Northern Petrochemical Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1973) (alleged
trade secret misappropriator who voluntarily abstained from using the secret information for
a longer time than it would have taken to develop the information through proper means held
free to use the information); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 537-40.
75. Lists of current or prospective customers, when not generally available to business
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subtopic, entitled "Protection from Governmental Disclosure,"
while a positive addition in concept, is cluttered by an underedited
and thus unduly lengthy case.7 6 A leading candidate for addition to
on programs
these materials would be some practical information
7
designed to protect companies' trade secrets. 1
Following a thorough airing of the trade secret preemption
problem, the chapter on predatory practices closes with a new and
interesting section entitled "A Case Study: Exploitation of Characters and Personalities." This includes a rundown of the melancholy
melodrama of the true Paladin (Victor DeCosta, not Richard
Boone)78 and concludes with the explosive case of the "human cannonball,"' a case which strengthens the view that Sears and
Compco have been devitalized and which, positioned as it is, serves
as an excellent bridge to the following chapter on copyright law.
The last chapter to be reviewed"0 covers copyright law. This
chapter appears to be generally sound but lacking in certain significant aspects of coverage. On the plus side are fundamentally wellchosen, well-organized cases and materials on the basics of copyright law. In particular there is a helpful new case on the protectibility of architectural drawings" and the "Monty Python" case 2 on the
intriguing "droit moral" issue. On the negative side, however, are
firms and especially when compiled through effort and expense, are treated as a type of trade
secret, since they tend to give competitive advantages to their owners.
76. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(probing the trade secret exemption of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4)
(1976)); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 542-48.
77.

See, e.g., S. OPPENHEIM & G. WEMSoN, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER

PROTECTiON 355-57 (3d ed. 1974).
78. E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 596-604.

79. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (state law protecting against misappropriation of a performer's "entire act" held not violative of the first
or fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution); see E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN,
supra note 4, at 610-18.
80. The last chapter in the book, on patent law, is apparently a very thorough explica-

tion of this technical area, but this reviewer does not feel qualified to review the topic.
81. Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972) (the copyright on a
set of architectural drawings is not abandoned by the reproduction of the floor plans in an
advertising brochure, and an unlicensed copying of the floor plan constitutes infringement of

the architectural drawings); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra note 4, at 646-51.
82.

Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (television net-

work, as licensee of a number of original films made by a British comedy group, allegedly
violated its contractual promise not to edit the films so as to impair their artistic integrity;
preliminary injunction granted on joint grounds of copyright infringement and "mutilation"
of the film in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act); see E. KrrcH & H. PERLMAN, supra

note 4, at 762-70.
83. "This cause of action, which seeks redress for deformation of an artist's work, finds
its roots in the continental concept of. . .moral right, which may generally be summarized
as including the right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the form in which he
created it." Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
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a list of shortcomings, mostly sins of omission rather than of commission. For example, why was the crucial opinion in the Williams
& Wilkins fair use case84 replaced by a much less explanatory
decision? 5 More importantly, why were the topics of ownership of
copyright rights, the manufacturing requirement, and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal ignored? Perhaps even more disquieting,
why is coverage of the constitutional underpinnings and the social
and economic bases of copyright given such extremely short shrift?
Lastly, why did the authors choose to omit all coverage of the remedies available for copyright infringement, indeed a crucial topic?"8
The answers to these questions are not apparent, especially since
the second edition lacks a prefatory note that might have explained
the authors' intentions in this regard. This reviewer must conclude
that the copyright chapter is disappointingly inadequate as a comprehensive introduction to copyright law.
Notwithstanding some surprising shortcomings, notably in the
copyright chapter, the general verdict of this reviewer remains that
the new edition of the Kitch and Perlman casebook is an excellent
vehicle for a wide-ranging course on Unfair Trade Practices. Indeed,
it still leads the pack in terms of sophistication and recognition of
the vital interactions of state and federal-particularly constitutional-principles, and this reviewer can commend it to anyone who
is willing to take the plunge into this difficult, challenging, but
gratifying domain.
84. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopying of professional journals by a federal
research organization to facilitate library research deemed "fair use").
85. Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)
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